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1 Introduction
The contrast between public views regarding the impact of
a disability on human well-being, also aired in scientific
discourse, and the views of disabled people regarding their
own well-being is considerable. Disabled people often
report a high level of subjective well-being, whilst the
outside assumption is that they have little reason to feel
like this, or that they are rationalising their situation, dis-
torting their perception or degrading themselves (Albrecht
and Devlieger 1999). The assumption endorsed in public
perception and in scientific discourse—including philoso-
phy and ethics—is that disability generally involves a
drastic reduction in overall well-being and that disability
not only implies relative disadvantage or affects certain
aspects of well-being (e.g. health, mobility or education)
but is overall a standard example of a serious detriment in
absolute well-being. In what follows I will challenge this
assumption. The problem I see in it is twofold. Firstly,
disability is often used as a generalisation, without further
specification of which disability is meant. I will indicate
which disabilities indeed result in a serious detriment in
human well-being or even make it impossible to apply the
very concept of well-being. Secondly, the assumption that
disability leads to a reduction in well-being in absolute
terms—again without further specification—is problem-
atic. Even if it is plausible to argue that it is better not to be
disabled than to be disabled, and that the impairment to a
bodily function or structure does affect elements of a good
life (e.g. health), it does not immediately follow that
overall well-being is affected in serious ways (Schramme
2013). Again, it is plausible to argue that impairments
affect overall well-being. But this alone does not tell us
how much and in what ways well-being is affected. If it did
directly follow that overall well-being is affected in severe
ways, then every affect on a single element of a good
human life would lead to an absolute detriment of well-
being. Human well-being is affected by various relative
disadvantages and is far from being perfect. However, in
order to understand the most pressing questions of justice
concerning disability on a theoretical and a practical level,
it is necessary to develop an understanding as to which
disabilities pose a serious detriment to a human well-being.
The impact of disability on human well-being has a
clear significance in two regards. Firstly, the significance is
of a theoretical nature. Assumptions about the impact of
disability on human well-being shape the form and content
of justice theories, for example (Nussbaum 2006). Sec-
ondly, a practical significance comes to light when
attempts at clarification of the impact of disability on well-
being are made on a cultural and social basis, affecting
dealings with, and treatment of people with disabilities.1
Two points are important. Firstly, I shall concentrate on
the issue of which disabilities are detrimental to human
well-being, and for which reasons. As in the following part
of the paper I concentrate mainly on the bio-statistical side
of disability and thus the impairment of bodily functions
and structures and their influence on human well-being,
I mainly speak of impairments instead of disabilities. I thus
highlight the descriptive side of the concept of disability.
F. Felder (&)
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1 For example, when a view predominates in society that certain
disabilities are concomitant with such a bad life that it would be better
for those affected to die than to live, then this attitude has a bearing on
the lives of those with the disability, e.g. regarding medical care.
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Secondly, in order to show which disabilities affect
human well-being in a serious way, I rely on a theory of
human well-being that is essentially objective, but includes
the subjective evaluation of one’s own happiness and sat-
isfaction with life as an important element. This conception
of well-being—for instance proposed by Nussbaum (2006,
76f.)—presumes that well-being is dependent upon
numerous objective criteria. Among these criteria are
bodily health and bodily integrity, affiliation, senses,
imagination and thought, emotions and practical reason
(e.g. being able to form a conception of the good). This
view on the good life in turn assumes that well-being as a
phenomenon is not subjective. And yet well-being is
evaluated by subjects or individuals. For this reason, firstly,
the subjective significance attributed by human beings to
particular circumstances or goods can differ without the
phenomenon itself being subjective. And secondly, we can
argue that the endorsement of one’s own life is an impor-
tant element of every objective account of well-being.
This view takes two intuitions into account: First, in
order to be a good life from a specific individual’s point of
view, a life has to be endorsed by the subject. It makes little
sense to say that a life is a good life for a certain individual
if the subject does not accept his or her life as a good one,
worth leading.2 To argue that the individual needs to
endorse his or her life is a matter of objective importance.
Thus, the subject’s happiness and satisfaction with life is
one element of a good life. Second, there is no contradic-
tion in claiming that, from an objective perspective, there
are good reasons to believe that certain impairments lead to
a drastic reduction in objective well-being, irrelevant of the
view of the individual. In that case, the objectively bad
aspects of life outweigh a possible positive evaluation of
the subject.
The argumentation runs as follows. Firstly, I advocate a
distinguishing of various categories of characteristics, traits
or abilities of people. At this point it becomes clear that, in
empirical terms, the impact on well-being of certain char-
acteristics, traits or abilities follows relatively stable pat-
terns. Secondly, I explain that we can also distinguish
impairments with regard to their impact on human well-
being. The content of these first two steps is descriptive and
backed by empirical evidence. In a third step, the moral
dimension of the argumentation is then revealed. Here I
advocate that we should turn to severe, all-encompassing
impairments if we wish to understand which impairments
involve a massive reduction in well-being, in turn involv-
ing serious moral implications. I shall present three
approaches which all rise to the challenge of documenting
states of being involving massively reduced well-being.
The first two approaches will then be rejected in favour of
the third, my own. The first approach is that of ‘normal
species functioning’ originally proposed by Boorse (1975),
but taken up and connected with arguments of justice by
Daniels e.g. (2001),3 whilst the second, proposed by
Buchanan et al. (2000), understands certain abilities as
‘general purpose means’. My own proposal advocates
comprehending impairments and well-being within the
context of a human, not necessarily biological community.
The assumption is that impairments are to be seen as
massively detrimental to human well-being when we can
no longer imagine a human community which believes
fundamental well-being still to be possible with social
adaptation. The conclusion summarises the most important
insights.
2 Comparative and Non-comparative Characteristics,
Traits and Abilities
Characteristics, traits and abilities are distributed differ-
ently among people. Some follow a particular distribution
structure, for instance a normal distribution. One example
of a normal distribution is intelligence. Others, for example
their sex, are distributed categorically. One is either—in
most cases at least—female or male. Finally, there are such
that do not follow any particular distribution structure
among people. They are predominantly intrinsic, i.e. come
from within and are not, or are only slightly societally or
socially influenced. One example of such a characteristic,
trait or ability is pain threshold or sensitivity to pain.
Different characteristics, traits or abilities not only fol-
low different distribution structures. Their impact on
human well-being also varies. With some it is relevant to
well-being where one stands within the distribution among
others. For example, it is usually disadvantageous to be
much shorter or much less intelligent than the societal
average. Having less of such a characteristic, trait or abil-
ity—measured according to the distribution among people
in society—leads to a relative disadvantage. Empirically
speaking, this correlation is relatively stable for different
2 The most we can say in this case is that the individual has little or
no reason to evaluate his or her life as a bad life. This does not
change, however, the fact the individual does not endorse its life, and
this may influence our perspective on this particular individual’s well-
being.
3 The ‘normal species functioning’ approach goes back to Boorse
(1975). There Boorse defends a naturalistic theory of health. Contrary
to his view, the view that all judgments of health are or include value
judgments is called normativism. According to Boorse, health in the
theoretical sense is value-free. In the practical sense, ‘‘health is
desirable insofar as it promotes goals one can justify on independent
grounds’’ (ibid., pp 61). These include e.g. the desirability for its
bearer. In what follows, I concentrate on Daniels’ (2001) interpre-
tation of the ‘normal species functioning’ account as he explicitly
connects it to a theory of justice and thus to moral considerations,
among them questions of a good human life.
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characteristics, traits or abilities occurring among people in
a particular way—often in a normal distribution.
In empirical terms, the impact on well-being of a cate-
gorically distributed characteristic, trait or ability does not
follow a clear, determined pattern, but is predominantly
subject to social, societal or cultural factors. Whether or not
it is disadvantageous to be female, for example, largely
depends on societal developments and cultural traditions.4
In contrast, the impact of a comparative, non-categorical
characteristic, trait or ability empirically follows a normal
distribution (albeit often somewhat distorted or shifted).
Because it occurs naturally, this correlation is neither
imperative nor inevitable. Nevertheless, empirical obser-
vations have shown it to be relatively stable. Since the
distribution among people is gradual, in contrast to com-
parative categorical characteristics, traits or abilities, it
seems obvious to assume that the impact on well-being will
follow the same rules. It can be shown that the impact is
also largely dependent upon societal evaluation processes,
and thus upon contingent historical and cultural factors.
What is considered beautiful today, may not be tomorrow.
And whether a certain height is advantageous or disad-
vantageous partly depends on how tall or short the other
people in that particular society are.5
If a characteristic, trait or ability is non-comparative,
then it has an intrinsic impact on well-being. This means
that societal or social influences do not, or at most mar-
ginally, play a role for well-being. This is particularly clear
taking the example of sensitivity to pain. Pain reduces
well-being independently of whether or not other people
are also in pain.6
As already mentioned, the difference between a com-
parative and a non-comparative characteristic, trait or
ability is significant because the impact on well-being is
considerably different. Whereas the former brings about a
relative reduction in well-being, the latter involves a non-
relative, drastic reduction in well-being (Schramme 2013).
However, in the bioethical debate about well-being, for
instance, there is frequent confusion concerning compara-
tive and non-comparative characteristics, traits or abilities,
as well as their impact on human well-being. In this debate,
many characteristics, traits or abilities are viewed as if their
impact on human well-being were exponential: as if having
more of them would be conducive to increased well-being.
For Julian Savulescu (2001), for example, intelligence is
one such characteristic. He is of the opinion that it is
definitely better to be more intelligent than less intelligent.
The underlying assumption is that intelligence definitely
increases human well-being. If therefore, in a hypothetical
scenario, we have the choice between three embryos, one
with an IQ of 70, one with 110 and one with 170, then
according to Savulescu (ibid.) we would do best to select
the one with an IQ of 170. For this embryo, in his view,
promises—ex ante7—the best prospects of achieving the
best life in absolute terms.
Intuitively speaking, many things initially favour this
assumption. It has also been backed up empirically, at least
in part. Satisfaction, social integration, the quality of per-
sonal relationships, the absence of mental diseases—these
are all factors which have been positively linked to intel-
ligence. They are important elements of every plausible
account of objective well-being and not only valued sub-
jectively (Gottfredson and Deary 2004; Neisser et al. 1996;
Whalley and Deary 2001). Vice versa it is also true that
mental disabilities increase the risk of psychiatric illness
(Einfield and Tonge 1996; Tonge et al. 1996) and thus
again not only affect the subject’s evaluation of its own
life, but also other elements of an objective account of
well-being, e.g. health. Different studies have come to the
following approximate conclusion: intelligent people tend
to have personal relationships they assess as more valuable,
tend to feel better integrated socially and tend to suffer
from fewer mental disorders and diseases than less intel-
ligent people. They also have a better education, are hap-
pier in their relationships and earn more money, enabling
them to enjoy a higher standard of living. They are
healthier and have a longer life expectancy. If one then
proceeds to assume that these and other factors are
important constituents of human well-being, then the
conclusion seems obvious that it is better to be more
4 In India, for example, being female tends to be detrimental to well-
being. Not only are the risks of being aborted, killed or raped far
higher for females than for males; in Indian society women are also at
a disadvantage compared to men with regard to education, healthcare
and employment (Sen 1990).
5 This can also be seen from how well or badly a society is equipped
to cope with the needs of certain people. A particularly impressive
example of this is an historical study of acquired deafness in Martha’s
Vineyard, and the adaptation of an entire society to the needs of its
deaf citizens (Groce 1985).
6 At face value, pain might have an important warning function for
human beings. To this extent pain is an important feature of the
human body and does not exist for no reason (indeed, it is sometimes
crucial for survival). And the impact of pain on human well-being is,
of course, also dependent upon the strength, intensity, duration and
outcome of the pain experienced. Strong pain is more debilitating
than weak pain. Long-lasting and intensive, chronic pain is worse
than brief and less intensive pain. When the outcome of pain is the
birth of a child, this is also to be evaluated differently than, for
example, phantom pain following the loss of a limb. Nevertheless,
sensitivity to pain is a largely intrinsic, non-comparative ability. One
might say that pain (except in its metaphorical sense, for example
pain at parting) can be causally classified as a pathological aspect of
human ability to function.
7 Other characteristics, traits or abilities and environmental factors,
as well as potential later influences—for example upbringing, school
or medical care—are excluded from the ex ante observation.
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intelligent than less intelligent. This results in the
assumption that the best life is the one with the highest
intelligence possible.
However, it has also been shown that the link between
well-being and intelligence is not correct in absolute terms.
Well-being does not per se increase exponentially with
intelligence. Empirical studies about the lives of excep-
tionally intelligent people (with an IQ above 160) have
shown that well-being does not increase with a high IQ, but
actually decreases (Persson 2007). People with exception-
ally high intelligence often feel socially isolated, have
mental problems and display apathetic behaviour towards
their surroundings. In addition, their actual performance
also frequently falls short of their performance potential
(Gross 2004).8 Very high intelligence, or even just intel-
ligence as an example of a comparative, non-categorial
characteristic, is thus able to demonstrate what is probably
also true of many other such characteristics, traits or abil-
ities (such as height or physical strength, as well as emo-
tional abilities like empathy, etc.): having more of it is not
always better. And this is probably also true vice versa:
having less is not necessarily worse. Again, it is important
to mention that not only the subjective evaluation of own’s
life is affected, but (maybe resulting in) a detriment of
other objective elements of human well-being such as
health or having social relationships.
Now these arguments might stand up regarding the
distinction between comparative and non-comparative
characteristics, traits or abilities. But do they still hold true
for impairments, or for the distribution of characteristics,
traits or abilities on the negative side of an X curve? Is an
impairment not always linked to a massive reduction in
well-being, i.e. not just in relative terms?
3 Comparative and Non-comparative Impairments
and their Impact on Human Well-Being
First of all, a more or less normal distribution of a char-
acteristic, trait or ability will contain negative values as a
matter of course. Once again, a telling example is intelli-
gence. Taking the definition used by the American Psy-
chiatric Association (2000), an IQ of 70 or less amounts to
a mental impairment. And there is actually empirical evi-
dence showing that the well-being of those with a mental
impairments is at least at risk (Tonge et al. 1996). Many
people with mental disabilities have psychiatric problems
or develop psychiatric illnesses over the course of their
lives (Holland 1999). This again, in my account, is not only
relevant because people with mental problems are not
likely to endorse their life subjectively, but because
(mental) health is an important element of objective well-
being.
This finding does not mean, however, that a mental
impairment (or other impairments) automatically leads to a
massive reduction in well-being. It is additionally unclear
how many impairments, or which ones, are detrimental to
well-being in absolute terms, i.e. substantially reduce well-
being. A whole series of impairments exists for which this
correlation is not true, or at least it is doubtful whether the
correlation has not changed in historical perspective. A
good example is Down’s Syndrome. Not only has the life
expectancy of people with Down’s Syndrome improved
dramatically over the past few decades, but their well-
being has also increased considerably with growing med-
ical care and education (Glasson et al. 2002). Conse-
quently, when questioned today, people with Down’s
Syndrome usually report high subjective satisfaction with
their lives (Roizen and Patterson 2003). In my opinion
there is no prima facie reason strong enough to doubt the
truth of these statements. Quite the contrary, concerning
rising standards, e.g. regarding health care and education,
people with Down’s Syndrome nowadays have reasons to
endorse their life, at least better reasons than they had a few
decades ago.
We therefore have to look to other, far ‘worse’ impair-
ments to find a serious impact on well-being. The first
pressing candidates are those impairments where not even
the most elementary prerequisites for an intrapersonal
evaluation of well-being are given. These are impairments
where even the basis of a subjective evaluation is non-
existent, and thus also the prerequisites for being able to
assess and report one’s own well-being. With these
impairments, the subjective conditions necessary for eval-
uating different states of being do not exist. Individuals
with such impairments are not in a position to distinguish
between a state X and a state Y or to react to them with
subjective expressions of comfort or displeasure.9 Not
being able to experience or assess one’s life, however,
8 The reasons for reduced well-being in the highly intelligent—
compared to less intelligent people—can be intrinsic. For example,
people with much higher intelligence can feel alienated from their
surroundings because they have no adequate conversation partners.
But other, contingent reasons can also play a role. For example,
poorly adapted environments—such as a lack of encouragement at
school or a shortage of challenges professionally—can also lead to
reduced well-being.
9 At this juncture it is important to understand that these character-
istics, traits or abilities are not exclusively or predominantly
cognitive. Prerequisites include, for example, sensory abilities or
basic forms of perception and communication. Therefore, excessive
intelligence is not required in order to be able to evaluate different
states. Even infants are capable of doing this. They express states such
as hunger, thirst or tiredness with various forms of screaming or
crying.
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poses a serious objective problem and does not only affect
the subject’s problem to endorse its life.
A particularly severe type of an impairment which
involves the absence of these prerequisites is anencephaly.
Children born with this condition do not possess the ana-
tomic structures for sensory processing, cognition or motor
coordination. In addition, they have no capacity for sensory
perception (Wilkinson 2006). If these elementary abilities
are lacking, it is possible to speak of an absolute reduction
in well-being: the prerequisites for evaluating well-being
do not exist. Even the categories needed to apply the
concept of well-being are missing. In other words: appli-
cation of the concept of well-being does not make any
sense here.
Beyond this clear-cut case, however, further criteria are
required before a massive reduction in well-being can be
assumed in conjunction with an impairment. In searching
for such criteria, the following process suggests itself. We
can ask which impairments increase the burdens of a life so
tremendously (for example by involving extreme pain or
other intrinsically induced physical suffering) that, as a
result, well-being is reduced in absolute terms. Possible
gains to be had from the impairment or from other existing
characteristics, traits or abilities are unable to outweigh
these burdens. Disabilities could thus be considered where
the impairment leads to such comprehensive limitations
that compensation (for example through other abilities) or
treatment by other means (for example the provision of
medical aids and appliances or rehabilitation) cannot pro-
vide any noteworthy increase in well-being. In the fol-
lowing I would like to present two possible candidates for
such an impairment with intrinsic limitations. They dem-
onstrate how at least the severe strains of these impair-
ments mean absolute reduction in human well-being, thus
fulfilling the criteria above.
The first disability is epidermolysis bullosa, a severe
congenital and genetic skin disease (Ultto et al. 1997). The
cause is a congenital mutation in certain genes, the prod-
ucts of which (including proteins) are necessary for the
intact cellular structure of the skin. The mechanical link
between the different skin layers is insufficiently formed.
Depending on the development of the disease, blisters and
wounds with scarring emerge on and in the whole body,
including the mouth and oesophagus. In particularly severe
forms of the disease, which can already be diagnosed at
birth, the internal organs are also affected. These forms
usually lead to an early death or take a progressive course.
This disease undoubtedly involves great pain. With regard
to their evaluation of their own life, human sufferers report
extreme limitations in different areas of life (Horn and
Tidman 2002). The more severe the disease is, and the
larger the skin areas affected by it are, the greater the
limitations reported (Tabolli et al. 2009).
A second impairment which could fulfil such criteria is
Tay-Sachs disease. It leads to advancing reduction in
cognitive skills, deterioration of psychomotor skills,
paralysis, spasticity, blindness, deafness, cramps, a cherry-
red macula in the retina and, within a few years, to death.
Diagnosed children usually die by the age of two or three.
They develop retrogressively until comatose and then die
(Fernandez Filho and Shapiro 2004). This disease also
involves intrinsic limitations, for example extreme pain, as
well as extensive loss or deterioration of key human abil-
ities. It is also so severe that it inevitably leads to death
within just a few months or years.10
In empirical surveys, those affected by the particularly
severe strain of epidermolysis bullosa RDEB-HS report
particularly low subjective well-being (Ultto et al. 1997).
Again, these subjective views are backed up by objective
reasons. The affected individuals can hardly move, have
almost no possibilities to build relationships and experi-
ence severe health problems associated with their condi-
tion. In severe cases at least, I believe it is possible to argue
that the burdens of such a life easily exceed any potential
gains. Suffering cannot be compensated for and is not or is
barely mitigated by medical aids or other external factors
or resources. In other words, the attitude and help of the
outside world to this impairment takes away nothing or
very little of its negative intrinsic quality.
In summary, the following can be said about the con-
nection between impairment and well-being. Firstly, there
are impairments where application of the term to well-
being makes no sense, in that the individual characteristics,
traits or abilities required to evaluate well-being are not
given. Therefore, purely for conceptual reasons, it makes
no sense to speak of well-being. Secondly, there are cases
in which the burdens of an impairment easily outweigh any
potential gains, and where no social endeavours can com-
bat them or compensate for them. These impairments are
also severe with regard to their impact on well-being.
These two categories of impairment where a massive
reduction in well-being can be spoken of seem to be
comprehensible. We can evaluate cases according to
whether the burdens are greater than the gains. But this
alone does not provide us with reasons for a moral link
between characteristics, traits or abilities and impairments
on the one hand, and human well-being on the other. In the
10 Both impairments are without a doubt severe, and yet regarding
their impact on well-being they cannot be equated to anencephaly. In
the latter it can be shown that the elementary prerequisites for well-
being are missing, so that the mere application of the term or concept
well-being seems to make little sense. In contrast, it is possible to
speak of well-being with both epidermolysis bullosa and Tay-Sachs
disease, in the sense that the term or concept of well-being can
plausibly be applied. Those affected by these impairments are capable
of reporting—even though voicing may not always be possible (for
example with Tay-Sachs)—the evaluation of their own well-being.
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following I will present two approaches which attempt just
this, before ultimately rejecting them in favour of a pro-
posal of my own.
4 Normal Species Functioning, All Purpose Means
and Communities of Disabled Human Beings
The two approaches which I would like to present and then
reject are the ‘normal species functioning’ approach (Bo-
orse 1975; Daniels 2001) and the ‘general purpose means’
approach (Buchanan et al. 2000).
The ‘normal species functioning’ approach interpreted
by Norman Daniels (2001) does not presume a direct link
between disease or impairment and well-being. Rather, he
attempts to connect well-being anthropologically to func-
tional abilities of the human species, to its physical struc-
tures and physical functions. For him, the special moral
significance of healthcare (but also food, shelter and other
resources undoubtedly necessary for well-being) results not
directly from its contribution to the well-being of human
beings, but from its contribution to so-called ‘normal
human functioning’. This in turn provides the objective
basis needed for potential well-being. According to Dan-
iels, the moral and social obligation is to provide institu-
tions which safeguard this potential. He writes: ‘‘Disease
and disability, both physical and mental, are construed as
adverse departures from or impairments of species-typical
functional organization, or ‘normal functioning’ for short.
The line between disease and disability and normal func-
tioning is drawn in the relatively objective and nonevalu-
ative context provided by the biomedical sciences, broadly
construed (though glaring misclassifications have also
occurred)’’ (Daniels 2001, pp 3).
In his opinion, progress in biomedicine has given us
objective indications for whether or not disease or dis-
ability conflict with so-called normal human functioning
and, consequently, lead to a reduction in well-being.
Daniels’ definition thus, on the one hand, makes it clear
that the reference point for evaluative efforts is ultimately
the species-typical functioning of human bodies. On the
other hand, it becomes clear that this description contains
an important normative purpose, as well as a definition of
human well-being.
In a second proposal for defining the relationship
between well-being and human functioning or impairment,
a different path is chosen. The ‘general purpose means’
approach favoured by Buchanan et al. (2000) attempts to
link human well-being to goods which are key to all con-
ceptions of human well-being. Buchanan et al. (ibid.
pp 167) write: ‘‘The typical human’s capacity for sight may
be thought of as a general-purpose-means—useful and
valuable in carrying out nearly any plan of life or set of
aims that humans typically have. It is a ‘good’ not only
from a distinct perspective or plan of life that some may
adopt but many others may reject. Instead, there are few
perspectives from which the loss of sight is not a harm, and
few perspectives from which having sight is not a benefit in
carrying out the plan of life a person has adopted.’’ It is
therefore not the difference between ‘harm’ and ‘benefit’
which is relevant, but between ‘general purpose means’,
important for all human beings and nearly all plans of life
and whose loss is connected with suffering for all plans of
life, and the means whose value and significance depend
upon exactly which plans or interests one would like to
pursue. According to Savulescus (2001), examples of
‘general purpose means’ are hearing, seeing, the ability to
concentrate, to interact with other human beings and to
respond to others with empathy.
In my opinion, both approaches must be deemed inad-
equate for determining which impairments lead to massive
reductions in well-being, and for which reasons. First of all,
the normative connection claimed in the ‘normal species
functioning’ approach between species-normal abilities,
i.e. those to be biologically expected, and human well-
being is controversial. Two reasons can be given. Firstly,
the extent to which the possession and execution of certain
abilities contribute to well-being it is not clear per se.
Many human characteristics, traits or abilities are part of
the normal biological equipment of the human species and
thus to be expected, without their absence necessarily
meaning a reduction in well-being.11 And secondly, the
metaethical question remains of why a descriptive func-
tional characteristic, trait or ability of the human body
would lead per se (and without further philosophical
assumptions) to a normative conclusion, namely the
assumption that an impairment involves a massive reduc-
tion in well-being.12
Other factors also lead to rejection of the proposals by
Daniels (2001) and Buchanan et al. (2000). The correlation
between species-typical functioning and human well-being
is just as contingent and non-imperative as the impact or
significance of certain characteristics, traits or abilities for
11 It is species-typical, for example, to be able to waggle one’s ears or
roll one’s tongue. Hardly anybody would go so far as to maintain,
however, that well-being is minimised when these abilities are
missing. Rather, it seems obvious to assume that there are certain, key
human characteristics, traits or abilities which are essential to human
well-being. Others are not essential, even though they might be part of
the ‘normal’ equipment of the human species.
12 It is important to keep in mind that these problems cannot be
solved by only referring to what is bio-statistically normal human
functioning. Firstly, there is a missing link between the descriptive
and the normative. Secondly, even if we have substantial knowledge
of which functionings affect certain elements of human well-being,
e.g. health, this information in itself does not tell us how and to which
degree human well-being is affected.
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a good life. Some of them, such as seeing, hearing or
walking are undoubtedly linked to well-being in that they
open up to us a host of chances and possibilities in life
which we would not have if we did not possess them. But it
is not true that well-being is automatically given when we
possess these characteristics, traits or abilities. In addition,
manifold empirical findings regarding the well-being of
blind, deaf or lame people emphatically show that in many
cases impairments can be compensated for, and new
options found regarding perception, comprehension or
mobility.
Characteristics, traits or abilities such as intelligence
undoubtedly make an important contribution to human
well-being. But this is not sufficient proof that possessing a
maximum of these characteristics, traits or abilities would
also mean a maximum of well-being. Also, in many cases it
is only in isolated observation—i.e. abstracted from envi-
ronmental influences, as well as from any other charac-
teristics, traits or abilities possessed by the individual—that
it is safe to assume that loss or absence of a characteristic,
trait or ability would lead to a massive reduction in well-
being. The possession or execution of certain characteris-
tics, traits or abilities does seem to be useful for many plans
of life. But this neither shows that their absence is
incompatible with well-being (because, for example, they
cannot be compensated for), nor makes it clear without
further normative assumptions how many of these char-
acteristics, traits or abilities it is necessary to have in order
to achieve well-being.
The two approaches therefore have to be rejected.
Which leaves the reasons for assuming a massive reduction
in well-being in conjunction with certain impairments still
unanswered. In the following I would like to put forward a
proposal of my own. The approach I advocate demands the
existence of a community of disabled people, all with a
certain disability, who would like to be integrated in
society and certain groups with or despite this disability.
Before I describe this approach in more detail, it is
important to understand that it requires assimilation of the
idea of a ‘life lived from the inside’. This again means that
well-being results both from the possession of certain
goods, cultural, societal and social evaluations and modes
of recognition—i.e. a comprehensive series of external
conditions—and from an internal evaluation, as well as
from life as a whole. Life has to be lived from the inside
out; one has to identify oneself with the life one leads. If
this is not the case, it is not possible to speak of well-being
in a comprehensive sense, however many goods or abilities
may exist objectively. In a paper on the intrinsic signifi-
cance of education, Brighouse (2006) expressed this idea as
follows: ‘‘For somebody actually to flourish, they have to
identify with the life they are leading. They have to live it
from the inside, as it were. Now someone can know that
their way of life suits them without knowing or thinking
much about alternatives, so they don’t have to think criti-
cally about the alternatives in order to identify with their
life. But they must, at the very least, not experience their
way of life as being at odds with their most fundamental
experienced interests and desires.’’ (Brighouse 2006,
pp 16).
Descriptions of ‘life from the inside’ can be found in
sociological studies, such as those by Williams (1998), and
in philosophical ones, such as those by Carel (2008). They
amount to phenomenologically consolidated descriptions
of life with disability, as well as the resulting normative
requirements regarding the safeguarding of well-being for
disabled people. They convey the thoughts and evaluations
of subjects, but at the same time are intersubjectively
comprehensible and based on objective reasons. These
phenomenological descriptions of disabled life are, on the
one hand, theoretically valuable because they enable peo-
ple not affected by disability to form an idea of what
leading such a life entails, in all its facets. Phenomeno-
logical approaches do not highlight characteristics, traits or
abilities in isolation, together with an equally artificially
isolated impact on human life, as is often the case in
analytical approaches. Rather, they assume that a life is
always lived through the coaction of very different char-
acteristics, traits or abilities, circumstances, resources,
relationships, etc., and ultimately needs affirmation as
relevant to one’s identity.
As stated already, these phenomenological descriptions
are in no way purely subjective. They do not embody the
personal diaries of individual people. Far more, through
their consolidated description they open up the possibility
of intersubjective communication, namely between those
affected, who can recognise themselves in the descriptions,
and those non-affected, who can join in with empathy. This
access is significant from a life-world point of view as well.
The significance of a life which is lived as affirmed and
deemed good, together with a desire to lead a life inte-
grated in society and in communities, also points to the
practical significance of self-help groups for the disabled.
In these self-help groups, precisely those processes occur
which can enable disabled people to lead a good life in
communities and in society, despite their impairment. The
prerequisite for participation in a self-help group is the will
and the desire to lead a good life integrated in society and
different communities. If such a thing is no longer practi-
cally possible, or no longer sought after, then one may
assume that the affected person no longer believes a good
life to be possible.
The chance or the will to lead a life which a human
being can personally experience as worthy brings us back
to subjective evaluations of life and an individual’s ability
to evaluate life and express such evaluations. The latter is
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not to be understood subjectivistically, in the sense of only
valid for individual subjects. Far more one is to imagine, at
least hypothetically, a community of disabled persons who
would have to evaluate life with this disability and report
the degree or extent of well-being it is possible to achieve
with such a life. This type of intersubjective communica-
tion can seek reinforcement or back-up from multidimen-
sional empirical studies investigating the well-being of
affected persons and particularly focusing on the dynamics
and mutual impact of intrinsic and extrinsic factors.
Valuable insights into life with a certain disability can also
be imparted by phenomenological studies, however, with
their consolidated descriptions enabling us to gain an
insight into what life must be like with a disability.
What could be achieved for the issue at stake here by
adopting this approach? My belief is that it would enable
disabilities to be described and ultimately understood and
evaluated normatively. The extent to which well-being
would be reduced by a particular impairment in absolute
terms could then be explored, at least as a mental experi-
ment: it is reduced when we can no longer imagine a group
or community of people sharing the same impairment who
affirm their life and—despite all the burdens posed by it—
ultimately believe it to be good.
5 Conclusion
In exploring the issue of which disabilities are detrimental to
human well-being and for which reasons, I have addressed
two misunderstandings. Firstly, the frequent sweeping gen-
eralisation that disability is an example of reduced well-being
in an absolute sense. Here it is crucial to specify which dis-
ability is meant because the impact on well-being can assume
very different shapes and qualities. Secondly, the confusion
of comparative and non-comparative or absolute viewpoints
regarding human well-being. Here, too, I have attempted to
show that argumentation needs to be more precise than is
often the case, for example in the bioethical debate.
There may be good reasons for claiming that it is better
not to be disabled than to be disabled. And yet this is not
proof that being disabled is bad for the affected person in
an absolute sense. A disability is only bad for a person in
an absolute sense if it denies that person a minimum of
elements absolutely crucial to human well-being. I have
attempted to show this using a mental scenario and asking
whether or not we can imagine a hypothetical community
of affected people all sharing the same fate who would
deem their life incompatible with a good life, not just
subjectively, but also in a manner which is comprehensible
intersubjectively. Provided this is not the case, those
affected by a disability seek contact to one another and
allow their lives to be described in a consolidated
phenomenological manner. Such descriptions, for example
by Carel (2008), report both the burdens of a life with
disability and its positive sides.
The negative side reveals that the most severe forms of
mental disability, for example anencephaly, are disabilities
where application of the term well-being makes no conceptual
sense. In these people the structural prerequisites for feeling
and evaluating well-being are lacking. And such impairments
exist, such as Tay Sachs or severe strains of epidermolysis
bullosa, in which the burdens of the disability exceed, or at
least can exceed the potential gain or potential compensations.
My own proposal, presented after a rejection of the pro-
posals by Daniels (2001) and Buchanan et al. (2000), is
admittedly vague, and in two respects. Firstly, its practical
significance requires more detailed formulation with regard
to certain historical and cultural realities. Secondly, it is of
theoretical interest and open to empirical investigation.
However, the exact relationship between empirical approa-
ches and the phenomenological view of disability still
requires precise, in-depth research.
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